Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) must maximize the realization of security goals while minimizing costs. In this paper, we study the problem of building cost-sensitive intrusion detection models. We examine the major cost factors associated with an IDS, which include development cost, operational cost, damage cost due to successful intrusions, and the cost of manual and automated response to intrusions.
Introduction
Accompanying our growing dependency on network-based computer systems is an increased importance on protecting our information systems. Intrusion detection (ID), the process of identifying and responding to malicious activity targeted at computing and networking resources [2] , is a critical component of infrastructure protection mechanisms.
A natural tendency in developing an intrusion detection system (IDS) is trying to maximize its technical effectiveness. This often translates into IDS vendors attempting to use brute force to correctly detect a larger spectrum of intrusions than their competitors. However, the goal of catching all attacks has proved to be a major technical challenge. After more than two decades of research and development efforts, the leading IDSs still have marginal detection rates and high false alarm rates, especially in the face of stealthy or novel intrusions [1, 17] . This goal is also impractical for IDS deployment, as the constraints on time (i.e., processing speed) and resources (both human and computer) may become overwhelmingly restrictive. An IDS usually performs passive monitoring of network or system activities rather than active filtering (as is the case with Firewalls). It is essential for an IDS to keep up with the throughput of the data stream that it monitors so that intrusions can be detected in a timely manner. A real-time IDS can thus become vulnerable to overload attacks [22] . In such an attack, the attacker first directs a huge amount of malicious traffic at the IDS (or some machine it is monitoring) to the point that it can no longer track all data necessary to detect every intrusion. The attacker can then successfully execute the intended intrusion, which the IDS will fail to detect. Similarly, an incident response team can be overloaded by intrusion reports and may be forced to raise detection and response thresholds [7] , resulting in real attacks being ignored. In such a situation, focusing limited resources on the most damaging intrusions is a more beneficial and effective approach.
A very important but often neglected facet of intrusion detection is its cost-effectiveness, or cost-benefit trade-off. An educated decision to deploy a security mechanism such as an IDS is often motivated by the needs of security risk management [5, 10, 21] . The objective of an IDS is therefore to provide protection to the information assets that are at risk and have value to an organization. An IDS needs to be cost-effective in that it should cost no more than the expected level of loss from intrusions. This requires that an IDS consider the trade-off among cost factors, which at the minimum should include development cost, the cost of damage caused by an intrusion, the cost of manual or automatic response to an intrusion, and the operational cost, which measures constraints on time and computing resources. For example, an intrusion which has a higher response cost than damage cost should usually not be acted upon beyond simple logging.
Currently these cost factors are, for the most part, ignored as unwanted complexities in the development process of IDSs. This is caused by the fact that achieving a reasonable degree of technical effectiveness is already a challenging task, given the complexities of today's network environments and the manual effort of knowledge-engineering approaches (e.g., encoding expert rules). Some IDSs do try to minimize operational cost. For example, the Bro [22] scripting language for specifying intrusion detection rules does not support for-loops because iteration through a large number of connections is considered time consuming. However, we do not know of any IDS that considers any other cost factors. These cost factors are not sufficiently considered in the deployment of IDSs either because many organizations are not educated about the costbenefits of security systems, and analyzing site-specific cost factors is very difficult. Therefore, we believe that the security community as a whole must study the cost-effective aspects of IDSs in greater detail to help make intrusion detection a more successful technology.
We have developed a data mining framework for building intrusion detection models in an effort to automate the process of IDS development and lower its development cost. The framework uses data mining algorithms to compute activity patterns and extract predictive features, and then applies machine learning algorithms to generate detection rules [14, 15] . Results from the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation showed that our ID model was one of the best performing of all the participating systems, most of which were knowledge-engineered [17] .
In this paper, we examine the relevant cost factors, cost models, and cost metrics related to IDSs, and report the results of our current research in extending our data mining framework to build cost-sensitive models for intrusion detection. We propose to use cost-sensitive machine learning techniques that can automatically construct detection models optimized for overall cost metrics instead of mere statistical accuracy.
We do not suggest that accuracy be ignored, but rather that cost factors be included in the process of developing and evaluating IDSs. Our contributions are not the specific cost models and cost metrics described, but rather the principles of cost analysis and modeling for intrusion detection.
Cost Factors and Metrics
In order to build cost-sensitive ID models, we must first understand the relevant cost factors and the metrics used to define them. Borrowing ideas from the related fields of credit card and cellular phone fraud detection, we identify the following major cost factors related to intrusion detection: damage cost, response cost, and operational cost. Damage cost (DCost) characterizes the amount of damage to a target resource by an attack when intrusion detection is unavailable or ineffective. Response cost (RCost) is the cost of acting upon an alarm or log entry that indicates a potential intrusion. Operational cost (OpCost) is the cost of processing the stream of events being monitored by an IDS and analyzing the activities using intrusion detection models.
We will discuss these factors in greater detail in Section 2.2.
Cost-sensitive models can only be constructed and evaluated when cost metrics are given. The issues involved in the measurement of cost factors have been studied by the computer risk analysis and security assessment communities. The literature suggests that attempts to fully quantify all factors involved in cost modeling usually generate misleading results because not all factors can be reduced to discrete dollars (or some other common unit of measurement) and probabilities [3, 6, 9, 10, 13] . It is recommended that qualitative analysis be used to measure the relative magnitudes of cost factors. It should also be noted that cost metrics are often site-specific because each organization has its own security policies, information assets, and risk factors [21] .
Attack Taxonomy
An attack taxonomy is essential in producing meaningful cost metrics. The taxonomy groups intrusions into different types so that cost measurement can be performed for categories of similar attacks. Intrusions can be categorized and analyzed from different perspectives. Lindqvist and Jonsson introduced the concept of the dimension of an intrusion and used several dimensions to classify intrusions [16] . The intrusion results dimension categorizes attacks according to their effects (e.g., whether or not denial-of-service is accom- fore affects the operational cost and the response cost. Also, the intrusion target dimension categorizes attacks according to the resource being targeted and affects both damage and response costs.
Our attack taxonomy is illustrated in Table 1 , and categorizes intrusions that occur in the DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation dataset, which was collected in a simulated military environment by MIT Lincoln
Lab [17] . In this dataset, each event to be monitored is a network connection, and the resources being attacked are mainly the network services (e.g., http, smtp, etc.) and system programs on a particular host in the network. We use the taxonomy described in Table 1 to first categorize the intrusions occurring in the dataset into ROOT, DOS, R2L, and PROBE, based on their intrusion results. Then within each of these categories, the attacks are further partitioned by the techniques used to execute the intrusion. The ordering of sub-categories is of increasing complexity of the attack method. Attacks of each sub-category can be further partitioned according to the attack targets. For simplicity, the intrusion target dimension is not shown.
This table also shows the damage cost (DCost) and response cost (RCost) of each intrusion category. The operation cost (OpCost) is not shown because it is measured in different units. These cost factors will be discussed later in the paper.
Cost Factors
When measuring cost factors, we only consider individual attacks detectable by IDSs. For example, a coordinated attack, or an attack scenario, that involves port-scanning a network, gaining user-level access to the network illegally, and finally acquiring root access, would normally be detected and responded to by an IDS as three separate attacks because most IDSs are designed to respond quickly to events occurring in real-time. It is therefore reasonable to measure the attacks individually. Researchers are actively studying algorithms and systems for detecting complex attack scenarios. As part of our future work, we will study the cost-sensitive aspects of detection for attack scenarios.
Damage Cost
There are several factors that determine the damage cost of an attack. Northcutt uses criticality and lethality to quantify the damage that may be incurred by some intrusive behavior [21] .
Criticality measures the importance, or value, of the target of an attack. This measure can be evaluated according to a resource's functional role in an organization or its relative cost of replacement, unavailability, and disclosure [10] . Similar to Northcutt's analysis, we assign 5 points for firewalls, routers, or DNS servers, 4 points for mail or Web servers, 2 points for UNIX workstations, and 1 point for Windows or DOS workstations. Lethality measures the degree of damage that could potentially be caused by some attack. For example, a more lethal attack that helped an intruder gain root access would have a higher damage cost than if the attack gave the intruder local user access. Other damage may include the discovery of knowledge about network infrastructure or preventing the offering of some critical service. For each main attack category in Table 1 , we define a relative lethality scale and use it as the base damage cost, or
. When assigning damage cost according to the criticality of the target, we can use the intrusion target dimension. Using these metrics, we can define the damage cost of an attack targeted at some resource as
. For example, a DOS attack targeted at a firewall has
, while the same attack targeted at a Unix workstation has
.
In addition to criticality and lethality, we define the progress of an attack to be a measure of how successfully an attack is in achieving its goals. For example, a Denial-of-Service (DOS) attack via resource or bandwidth consumption (e.g. SYN flooding) may not incur damage cost until it has progressed to the point where the performance of the resource under attack is starting to suffer. The progress measure can be used as an estimate of the percentage of the maximum damage cost that should be accounted for. That is, the actual cost is
. However, in deciding whether or not to respond to an attack, it is necessary to compare the maximum possible damage cost with the response cost. This requires that we assume a worst-case scenario in which
Response Cost
Response cost depends primarily on the type of response mechanisms being used. This is usually determined by an IDS's capabilities, site-specific policies, attack type, and the target resource [5] . Responses may be either automated or manual, and manual responses will clearly have a higher response cost.
Responses to intrusions that may be automated include the following: termination of the offending connection or session (either killing a process or resetting a network connection), rebooting the targeted system, recording the session for evidence gathering purposes and further investigation, or implementation of a packet-filtering rule [2, 21] . In addition to these responses, a notification may be sent to the administrator of the offending machine via e-mail in case that machine was itself compromised. A more advanced response which has not been successfully employed to date could involve the coordination of response mechanisms in disparate locations to halt intrusive behavior closer to its source.
Additional manual responses to an intrusion may involve further investigation (perhaps to eliminate action against false positives), identification, containment, eradication, and recovery [21] . The cost of manual response includes the labor cost of the response team, the user of the target, and any other personnel that participate in response. It also includes any downtime needed for repairing and patching the targeted system to prevent future damage.
We estimate the relative complexities of typical responses to each attack type in Table 1 in order to define the relative base response cost, or
. Again, we can take into account the criticality of the attack target when measuring response cost. That is, the cost is
In addition, attacks using simpler techniques (i.e., sub-categories £ .1 in our taxonomy) generally have lower response costs than more complex attacks (i.e., sub-categories £ .2), which require more complex mechanisms for effective response.
Operational Cost
The main cost inherent in the operation of an IDS is the amount of time and computing resources needed to extract and test features from the raw data stream that is being monitored 1 . We associate OpCost with time because a real-time IDS must detect an attack while it is in progress and generate an alarm as quickly as possible so that damage can be minimized. A slower IDS which uses features with higher computational costs should therefore be penalized. Even if a computing resource has a "sunken cost" (e.g., a dedicated IDS box has been purchased in a single payment), we still assign some cost to the expenditure of its resources as they are used. If a resource is used by one task, it may not be used by another task at the same time. The cost of computing resources is therefore an important factor in prioritization and decision making.
Some features cost more to gather than others. However, costlier features are often more informative for detecting intrusions. For example, features that examine events across a larger time window have more 1 For simplicity, we omit the discussion of personnel cost involved in administering and maintaining an IDS.
information available and are often used for "correlation analysis [2] " in order to detect extended or coordinated attacks such as slow host or network scans [5] . Computation of these features is costly because of their need to store and analyze larger amounts of data.
Based on our extensive experience in extracting and constructing predictive features from network audit data [14] , we classify features into four relative levels, based on their computational costs:
Level 1 features can be computed from the first packet, e.g., the service.
Level 2 features can be computed at any point during the life of the connection, e.g., the connection state (SYN WAIT, CONNECTED, FIN WAIT, etc.).
Level 3 features can be computed at the end of the connection, using only information about the connection being examined, e.g., the total number of bytes sent from source to destination.
Level 4 features can be computed at the end of the connection, but require access to data of potentially many other prior connections. These are the temporal and statistical features and are the most costly to compute. The computation of these features may require values of the lower level (i.e., levels 1, 2, and 3) features.
We can assign relative magnitudes to these features according to their computational costs. For example, level 1 features may cost 1, level 2 features may cost 5, level 3 features may cost 10, and level 4 features may cost 100. These estimations have been verified empirically using a prototype system for evaluating our ID models in real-time that has been built in coordination with Network Flight Recorder [20] .
Cost Models
A cost model formulates the total expected cost of intrusion detection. It considers the trade-off among all relevant cost factors and provides the basis for making appropriate cost-sensitive detection decisions. We first examine the cost trade-off associated with each possible outcome of observing some event ¥ , which may represent a network connection, a user's session on a system, or some logical grouping of activities being monitored. In our discussion, we say that (CCost), as they are incurred as a consequence of prediction, and are outlined in Table 2 .
FN Cost is the cost of not detecting an attack, and is always incurred by systems that do not install IDSs.
When an IDS falsely decides that a connection is not an attack and does not respond to the attack, the attack will succeed, and the target resource will be damaged. The FN Cost is therefore defined as the damage cost associated with event
TP Cost is incurred in the event of a correctly classified attack, and involves the cost of detecting the attack and possibly responding to it. To determine whether response will be taken, TN Cost is always 0, as it is incurred when an IDS correctly decides that an event is normal. We therefore bear no cost that is dependent on the outcome of the decision. , has a label of normal or one of the intrusions, we define the cumulative cost of the IDS as follows:
where CCost ¥ ¤ , the consequential cost of the prediction by the IDS on ¥ , is defined in at a conceptual level. That is, when evaluating IDSs, we can consider both the cumulative OpCost and cumulative CCost, but actual comparisons are performed separately using the two costs. This inconvenience cannot be overcome easily unless all cost factors are represented using a common measurement unit, or there is a reference or comparison relation for all the factors. Site-specific policies can be used to determine how to uniformly measure these factors.
Cost-Sensitive Modeling
Similar to risk analysis [3] , cost-sensitive modeling for intrusion detection must be performed periodically because cost metrics must take into account changes in information assets and security policies. It is therefore important to develop tools that can automatically produce cost-sensitive models for given cost metrics.
We have developed and evaluated the use of many machine learning methods for reducing the CumulativeCost of intrusion detection [12, 18] . Because of space constraints, in this section and Section 5 we describe and evaluate the particular methods which have proven most effective in building cost-sensitive models.
Reducing Operational Cost
In order to reduce OpCost, ID models need to use low cost features as often as possible while still maintaining a desired level of accuracy. Our approach is to build multiple ID models, each of which uses different sets of features at different cost levels. Low cost models are always evaluated first by the IDS, and high cost models are used only when the low cost models cannot make a prediction with sufficient accuracy.
We implement this multiple-model approach using RIPPER [8] , a rule induction algorithm. However, other machine learning algorithms or knowledge-engineering methods may be used as well.
Given a training set in which each event is labeled as either normal or some intrusion, RIPPER builds an ordered or unordered ruleset. Each rule in the ruleset uses the most discriminating feature values for classifying a data item into one of the classes. A rule consists of conjunctions of feature value comparisons, and if the rule evaluates to true, then a prediction is made. An example rule for predicting teardrop is
." Before discussing the details of our approach, it is necessary to outline the advantages and disadvantages of ordered and un-ordered rulesets.
Ordered Rulesets: An ordered ruleset has the form uses the minimal description length to guess an optimal ordering [19] . After arranging the classes, RIPPER finds rules to separate
, then rules to separate
, and so on. The final class,
, will become the default class. The end result is that rules for a single class will always be grouped together, but rules for
are possibly simplified, because they can assume that the class of the example is one of
If an example is covered by rules from two or more classes, this conflict is resolved in favor of the class that comes first in the ordering.
An ordered ruleset is usually succinct and efficient. Evaluation of an entire ordered ruleset does not
require each rule to be tested, but proceeds from the top of the ruleset to the bottom until any rule evaluates .
Un-ordered Rulesets:
An un-ordered ruleset has at least one rule for each class and there are usually many rules for frequently occurring classes. There is also a default class which is used for prediction when none of these rules are satisfied. Unlike ordered rulesets, all rules are evaluated during prediction and conflicts are broken by using the most accurate rule. Un-ordered rulesets, in general, contain more rules and are less efficient in execution than is obtained for every class, and determines the tolerable precision required for a prediction to be made in execution.
In real-time execution, the feature computation and rule evaluation proceed as follows: 
Real-Time Implementation
We have implemented a system that is capable of evaluating a set of cost-sensitive models in real-time.
This system uses a sensor for extracting light-weight, or "primitive," features (usually levels 1 and 2) from raw network traffic data. Higher level feature computation and model evaluation are offloaded to a separate entity, "Judge." The motivation for offloading this computation and evaluation is to avoid overburdening the sensor (in this case a packet sniffing engine), which must be able to monitor very high-bandwidth networks.
Judge uses models computed using the techniques described in the previous section. is evaluated. The logic for determining when a prediction is made is the same as is described in the previous section.
Thus far, we have implemented this system using NFR as the sensor, however, the protocol for communication between the sensor and Judge allows any sensor which extracts features from a data stream to be used. We are in the process of adapting a number of host-based sensors to serve as Judge clients.
Reducing Consequential Cost
A traditional IDS that does not consider the trade-off between RCost and DCost will attempt to respond to every intrusion that it detects. As a result, the consequential cost for FP, TP, and misclassified hits will always include some response cost. We use a cost-sensitive decision module to determine whether response should ensue based on whether DCost is greater than RCost.
The decision module takes as input an intrusion report generated by the detection module. The report contains the name of the predicted intrusion and the name of the target, which are then used to look up the pre-determined DCost and RCost. If DCost ¡ RCost, the decision module invokes a separate module to initiate a response; otherwise, it simply logs the intrusion report.
The functionality of the decision module can also be implemented using a data re-labeling technique such as MetaCost [11] , which re-labels intrusions with DCost ¢ RCost to normal so that the generated model will not contain rules for predicting these intrusions at all. We have experimented with such a mechanism [12] and have found that models trained on these datasets are much smaller and incur less operational cost. However, reducing consequential cost using a post-detection decision module eliminates the time consuming need to re-train models when cost factors change.
Experiments
Our experiments use data that was distributed by the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program.
The data was gathered from a military network with a wide variety of intrusions injected into the network over a period of 7 weeks. The details of our data mining framework for data pre-processing and feature extraction is described in our previous work [15] . We used 80% of the data for training the detection models. The training set was also used to calculate the precision of each rule and the threshold value for each class label. The remaining 20% were used as a test set for evaluation of the cost-sensitive models.
Measurements
We measure expected operational and consequential costs in our experiments. The expected average operational cost per event over the entire test set is defined as
. In all of our reported results, 
Results
In all discussion of our results, we use . Table 3 CCost measurements are shown in Table 4 . The , and corresponds to the cost model in Table 2 . A cost insensitive method, on the other hand, responds to every predicted intrusion and is representative of current brute-force approaches to intrusion detection. The last row of the table shows the error rate (¥ ¥ ) of each model.
As shown in Table 4 , the cost sensitive methods have significantly lower CCost than the respective cost insensitive methods for both single and multiple models. The reason is that a cost sensitive model will only respond to an intrusion if its response cost is lower than its damage cost. The error rates for all 6 models are very low (¢ .
It is important to note that all results shown are specific to the distribution of intrusions in the test data set. We can not presume that any distribution may be typical of all network environments.
Related Work
Several researchers and experts have pointed out the importance of using intrusion detection (and computer security in general) as a means of risk management [10, 5, 21] . Our work in cost-sensitive modeling for
IDSs has benefited from their insightful analysis and extensive real-world experiences.
Researchers have begun to develop principles and theories for intrusion detection. Axelsson [4] pointed out that the established fields of detection and estimation theory are similar to intrusion detection. For example, the subject of an anomaly detection model corresponds to the "signal source" in detection and estimation theory, the auditing mechanism corresponds to "signal transmission," the audit data corresponds to the "observation space," and in both cases, the task is to derive detection rules. Therefore, the results from detection and estimation, which have been found applicable to a wide range of problems, may be used in the IDS domain. One of the key findings by Axelsson is that a detection model should be optimized for some utility function, which need not represent statistical accuracy, but instead could involve some definition of cost. This finding validates the motivation of our research described in this paper.
As discussed throughout this paper, our work draws from research in computer security assessment and intrusion taxonomies. In particular, Glaseman et al. discussed a model for evaluating the total expected cost in using a security system . However, our definition of consequential cost allows cost-based optimization strategies to be explored because it includes the response cost and models its relationship with damage cost.
Credit card and cellular phone fraud detection are closely related to intrusion detection because they also deal with detecting abnormal behavior. Both of these applications are motivated by cost-saving, and therefore, use cost-sensitive modeling techniques. In credit card fraud detection, for example, the cost factors include operation cost, the personnel cost of investigating a potentially fraudulent transaction (known as challenge cost), and loss (damage cost). If the dollar amount of a suspected transaction is lower than the challenge cost, the transaction is authorized and the credit card company will take the potential loss. Since the cost factors in fraud detection can be folded into dollar amounts, the cost-sensitive analysis and modeling tasks are much more simple than in intrusion detection.
Cost-sensitive modeling is an active research area in data mining and machine learning because of the demand from application domains such as medical diagnosis and fraud and intrusion detection. Several techniques have been proposed for building models optimized for given cost metrics. In our research we study the principles behind these general techniques and develop new approaches according to the cost models specific to IDSs.
Conclusion
It is very important to establish the cost-effectiveness of intrusion detection because the ultimate goal of an IDS is to protect the information assets that are at risk and are most valuable to an organization. In this paper, we have examined cost factors that are relevant to intrusion detection, which include development cost, operational cost, damage cost, and response cost. We have shown that it is necessary to use an attack taxonomy along with organization-specific security policies and priorities to measure these cost factors.
We studied the trade-off relationships among these factors and defined consequential cost to be the cost associated with the predictions of an IDS. The total expected cost of an IDS is the sum of the operational and consequential costs. The cost-benefit of an IDS is manifested in its abilities to reduce this total expected cost. We presented a multiple model machine learning approach for reducing operational cost and a postdetection decision module for reducing consequential cost. Empirical evaluation using the DARPA Intrusion Evaluation dataset shows that our approaches are indeed effective.
As pointed out by Dorothy Denning, cost analysis (and risk assessment in general) is not an exact science because precise measurement of relevant factors is often impossible [10] . Cost-benefit analysis and modeling, however informal or incomplete, is often very helpful for an organization to determine appropriate protection mechanisms. The study of cost-sensitive modeling for intrusion detection is both challenging and extremely important. Our main contributions to this study are in the development of a framework for analyzing cost factors and building cost-sensitive models. In doing so, we offer a better understanding of the development and deployment of cost-effective IDSs.
Future Work
It is possible to improve the accuracy of ID models trained using our multiple model approach by using the maximum precision of all models for a given class as the threshold for firing a prediction, rather than the precision of the final and most costly model. The motivation for this approach is that learning algorithms do not necessarily produce more accurate models as more features are used in training. In fact, models using richer feature sets may even be too complex and less accurate for certain classes than less costly models.
We would expect to see slightly higher accuracy using this approach. However, since model evaluation may proceed farther into the chain of more costly models, there would be a penalty in operational cost.
One limitation of our current modeling techniques is that when cost metrics change, it is necessary to reconstruct new cost-sensitive models. For future work, we will study methods for building dynamic models that do not require re-training. These techniques will help reduce the cost of re-learning models due to changes in intra-site cost metrics and deployment at diverse sites with inherently different cost models.
We will study cost-sensitive analysis and modeling techniques for detection of complex attack scenarios.
We will also study how to incorporate uncertainty of cost analysis due to incomplete or imprecise estimation, especially in the case of anomaly detection systems, in the process of cost-sensitive modeling. And we will perform rigorous studies and experiments in a real-word environment to further refine our cost analysis and modeling approaches.
